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SANCTITY OF TREATIES
By Theodore P. Ion, Boston University Law School.
Distinguished jurists and eminent internationalists have often
discussed the question of the true meaning of the sanctity or in-
violability of treaties, without being able to come to a definite un-
derstanding, their ideas having not yet crystalized into any con-
crete form, giving satisfaction both to the legal science and the
practical exigencies of bodies politic.
In ireviewing the practice of the people of ancient times, we see
that faith to covenants was in some way their watchword, religious
rites being the cardinal feature of their conclusion, although they
may, at times, have deviated from the strict observance of their
treaty obligations.
Notwithstanding the narrowness of views of the "chosen people
of Israel" in their dealings with alien nations, and, to use the
words of a distinguished philosopher jurist,' "the little harmony
existing between international compacts and the Mosaic spirit,"
such instruments were, nevertheless, frequently used by the Jews
in their intercourse with foreign nations,' their faithful execution
being, as it is asserted, a distinct feature of the character of that
race.3
However, it seems that the Jewish law forbade the conclusion
of treaties with the heathen nations. As in all the nations of the
ancient world, war was a general, and peace an exceptional con-
dition; so with the Hellenic peoples, the existence of a treaty with
foreigners was considered by them as being a preliminary neces-
sity for having friendly intercourse with such alien nations.
4 And
as they attached great importance to the fulfilment of their obliga-
tions towards foreign nations, they impressed on international
compacts the character of sacredness, by invoking the divine
wrath upon those who would violate such covenants. On the
1 See Laurent, Etudes sur rHistoire de i'humaniti, Vol. I, p. 395.
2 See Grotius, Le Droit de la Guerre et de la Paix, Lib. II, Ch. XV,
9. i. ed. P. Fod~ri, Vol. II, p. 250.
3 See J. L. Saalschutz, Das Mosaische Recht, ed. 1853, p. 654.
4 Laurent op. cit. I, p. 46.
"Oure rcl 'Xeira 7o PlNov xat "Mlat
cate 7os Pappdpovv .& C S. 1,oed elPar
Isocrates adv. Callim, S. 27, quoted by Laurent OP. cit. 46, Note 3.
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other hand the deposition of such instruments in a temple and the
annual oaths for their faithful execution, showed the high regard
that the Hellenic people had for treaties.5
As it is attested by the ancient writers, it was the general prac-
tice of the people of antiquity to consider a solemn oath as the
most important, if not the most effectual, sanction for the faith-
ful fulfilment of promises.0
The conception of international relations of the early Romans
did not differ much from that of the Greeks. War being the
natural condition also with them, peace therefore could only be
secured by a treaty. But as such compacts were considered as
being merely truces, they expired, during the Regal period, after
the death of the King.7
As in private cofitracts, so in international compacts, sacra-
mental forms were absolutely necessary for their validity, religious
rites being, besides, an integral part of such- formalities. The
impressive ceremonies performed for the faithful execution of
treaties, such as the invocation to Jupiter and the imprecations
for the punishment of the violators of such agreements, the
solemn oath taken by the King in the early days of Rome and
later by the Consuls; the deposit of the instruments in the sacred
temple of Jupiter at the Capitol, notwithstanding the assertion to
5 Laurent op. cit. Vol. II, p. 145. Herod. IX, 7; Thuycd., V, 18 and23. Polyb. XXVII, i6, 3, quoted by Laurent, op. cit. p. 145, notes 2 and 3.
8 See Grotius, op. cit. II, p. 187, et seq. Also Geffken in Holtzendorf's
Handbuch der Volkerrecht, Vol. III, p. 85, ct seq. Also Fustel de Cou-langes, La Citg Antique, p. 245. Solon, after framing the laws and consti-
tution of Athens, departed from the city, but not before the Senate and theArchons took the oath that they would not modify the new legislation for
ten years.
See Grote, Part II, Vol. III, Ch. XI.
"There is a son of the oath," said the Pythoness, "a child without name,
without hands and feet. He, however, pursues with swiftness until it
catches a whole house and destroys them." Herod., Lib. VI, quoted by
Grotius II, p. i8g.
"'Opxov U& 7rpOUf7C8iy7S 4W1,ECEe7iPCL
TvUX IKCL7&77j. 8LUG& -tap OvdUETa,
WX0 7e p4S#LIP, xACIT eeo$s 6papravetv.
Sophocles, X4. 'Irroaz. wapa Xroflatta
quoted by N. I. Saripolos, in -T& 1-63 10wM dp,fr ;- Kal & =iXjuw Nj1uz.
p. 211, note B
7See Laurent op. cit. Vol. III, p. 12, et seq.
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the contrary, s must have had a powerful influence on the minds of
the Roman people.'
According to the Roman belief, a violation of a treaty by their
authorities exposed the whole people to the divine anger.'
0 Even
during the Empire a solemn oath was still a distinctive feature of
that epoch supposed to insure the fulfilment of promises made in
treaties," the gods being considered even in the days of Nero as
protectors of treaties.2
Notwithstanding all these religious solemnities and the "divine
sanction," for the observance of treaties, the Romans were not less
accused than the Greeks or Carthaginians for violating their
pledges whenever it suited their interests. A Thessalian trick, or
Cretan perfidy, or to act as the Parians,"
3 were not less known ex-
pressions than Punic or Roman faith.'
As is well known, besides the solemn oaths, the ancient na-
tions considered the taking of hostages as an additional security
for the faithful execution of their treaty obligations.
Nor are these securities left to oblivion. As a matter of fact,
they were frequently in usage in the middle ages and even at a
much later epoch such proceedings were not considered as being
obsolete and out of date. 5 And up to comparatively recent times,
the Christian nations of Europe looked upon oaths taken solemnly
on the altar of a church as one of the best securities for the faith-
8 See Montesquieu, Esprit des lois, XXI, ii, quoted by Laurent, Vol.
III, p. 24.
9 See Laurent, op. cit. II, p. 23. See also F. de Coulanges, op. cit.
pp. 246, 247.
10 See Grotius, Lib. IT, Ch. XV, 3, 1, ed. Fodiri II, p. 239. Also
Geffeken in Holtz., op. cit. III, p. i6. Sir Travers Twiss, The Law of Na-
tionS, p. 231, ed. x86x. Walker, History of the Law of Nations, p. 47. Even
during the Empire a solemn oath was still a distinctive feature of 
that
epoch, supposed to insure the fulfilment of promises made in treaties; 
the
gods being considered, even in the days of Nero, as protectors 
of treaties.
" See Rivier, Principes du Droit des Gens, Vol. II, p. 94.
12 See Walker, op. cit. p. 61. Mohammed also attached great impor-
tance to a solemn oath. "Perform," he said, "your covenant in God 
. . .
and violate not your oaths." Coran, Ch. XVI, 93. "Take not your 
oaths
between you deceitfully, lest your foot slip, after it has been steadfastly
fixed." Ib., Ch. XVI, 96.
]a Laurent op. cit. 1I, p. 146, 147.
'4Laurent, op. cit. III, p. 24.
25 See Grotius, op. cit. Lib. TIT, Ch. XX. 42. ed. Fodir6, Vol. III, pp.
46-417.
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ful performance of international compacts.' Vattel, whose writ-
ings shed so much light on the principles of the law of nations,"7
unlike Grotius, and other writers of the time of the illustrious
Dutch jurist 18-- champions in forcible language that the prin-
ciple of the oath is not an obligation in the legal sense, and that
consequently it cannot alter the nature of a treaty; and that, there-
fore, the death of the person who took the oath cannot impair the
validity of that instrument. In fine, that if a treaty is null and
void the oath cannot make it valid.29
Besides solemn oaths, the kissing of the cross, submission to
ecclesiastical censure, ex-communication by the Pope, and various
other means of insuring the faith of treaties, seem to have been
quite favored for many centuries; in mediaeval Europe, some of
them being even used in much later times.20 The custom of tak-
ing hostages is even preserved in modern times, and is used by
the civilized nations in their dealings with barbarous tribes of
people, rather as a means of intimidation than a real security for
the faithful performance of the promises made by such tribes.2
It is not unusual to bind such people, however, by solemn oaths. 2
The appearance of the Mohammedan conquerors, such as the
Arabs in the East, the Moors in Spain, and the Turks in the
18 Bluntschli, Le Droit International Codifii, ed. Lardy, art. 425, Note
z. See also Pradier Fodri, Traith de Droit International public, Vol. II,p. 1157. The latest example of that character is that of the treaty of
alliance concluded between France and Switzerland, when the plenipoten-
tiaries of both parties took an oath in a cathedral for the faithful execu-
tion of their agreements. Cf. P. Fodr6, II, No. 1157.
17 See Vattel, Le Droit des Gens, ed. P. Fodr, Vol. II, Sec. 225, et seq.28 See Grotius, op. cit. II, Ch. XIII, i ed. P. Fod6r6, p. i86.
29 See instances of interpositions to treaty obligations by various
Popes, by the right claimed by the Holy See to absolve sovereigns from
their oaths. The most remarkable example is that of a papal bull de-
claring as null and void certain articles of the famous treaty of West-
phalia of 1648. For details see Vattel, op. cit. II, S. 223, 224, ed. Fodr6,
PP. 224, 225. It seems that even now the theory of .the Vatican in regard
to the concordats concluded between th6 Papal See and foreign pow-
ers, is that the Church has the right to abrogate such agreements if they
subsequently appear to be contrary to her interests. Rivier draws from
that view the just conclusion that the other contracting parties have the
same right. (Rivier, op. cit. II, p. x34.)
20 See G. F. de Martens, Precis de Droit des Gens Moderns, L. II,
Clh. 63. Also P. Fodri, op. cit. II, 1156.
21 See P. Fodri, op. cit. II, No. io6o.
22
"See Bluntschli, op. cit. art. 425, Note i.
272 YALE LAW JOURNAL
Byzantine Empire, and the frequent disregard generally of their
agreements with "infidels" (as it seems in contravention to the
express command of their prophet) was not more reprehensible
than the doctrine laid down by Christian casuists, that treaties
concluded by Christian nations with the disciples of the "Arabian
impostor," may be violated with impunity.
23
Grotius, taking part in the controversy of his time in respect to
the propriety of concluding treaties with nations who did not
profess the true religion, exhausted all his known learning and
acumen in order to prove that the difference of religion could not,
by right, be an impediment to entering into compacts with non-
Christians, asserting that the right of concluding treaties was
founded on natural law; he also refuted the argument of some
theologians by showing that neither the Mosaic law nor the Chris-
tian faith prohibited the disciples of Moses or of Christ from en-
tering into agreements with people of any other faith.
24
23 "Perform the covenant," it is said in the Koran, "which ye shall
have made with them (the idolators) until they shall be elapsed." See
Coran, Ch. IX, 4. Mohammed in his letter to Prince John of Ayla, by
which he summoned the latter either to accept the new faith or to pay
tribute, promised him, in case of compliance with his demand, to defend
the Christian prince against all his foes; he, however, made an exception
for any further demand which could have been made "by the Lord or his
apostle," namely Mohammed, which, in plain words, means that the
prophet was not bound to continue the promised protection, if he had
ever the fancy to change his mind. The tendency of the Mohammedans
to violate their covenants with non-Moslems could be seen even during the
life of the Arabian Prophet himself. Thus, when Abdalla criticised the
leader Obada for not keeping faith with some of the Jewish tribes in
Arabia, Mohammed's general replied, "Hearts have changed, Islam hath
blotted all treaties out." See Muir, Life of Mohammed, p. 235. See also
an instance of a violation of a treaty by the prophet himself. Muir, Ib.
p. 177. In consequence of the representations made by the Foreign Pow-
ers in regard to the infractions of the capitulations by the provincial au-
thorities in Turkey, the Grand Vizier issued a circular to the Governors
in the Empire instructing them to abstain from any violation of the rights
enjoyed by foreigners through the capitulations. "The Ottoman govern-
ment," said the circular, "finds it natural to respect the treaties, and
pending their abrogation, with the consent of the interested parties, of
various articles of those treaties which are contrary to European public
law and restrictive of Ottoman sovereignty, wishes to give an evidence
of its loyalty to keep its engagements in the present as it did in the past."
(See Levant Herald, of Constantinople, February 17, i91o.) One might
ask the Grand Vizier whether it is the faith to treaties which prompted him
to issue this circular, or paramount force and the desire to win the good
will of the powers in order to attain the end in view.
24 See Grotius Lib. II, Ch. XV, 8, et seq. ed. Fodiri II, p. 249, et seq.
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Vattel, indorsing the view of Grotius, namely, that treaties are
regulated by natural law, says that all nations enter into compacts,
not as Christians or Mohammedans, but as human beings; and
that it is necessary for their common salvation to be able to con-
clude treaties, and that, with safety.2 '
On the other hand, referring to the contention of some Catholic
writers that faith should not be kept with heretics, he calls it
"a monstrous maxim. ' '26
But as all such would-be securities for the faithful execution
of treaties, consisting of oaths, hostages, excommunications and
the like measures are entirely obsolete, the contracting parties
now generally rely on their mutual good faith for the carrying out
of their obligations undertaken by international compacts.
Now, can a state, after concluding a treaty, in due form, abro-
gate it ex parte without the consent of the other contracting party
or parties to it? Would not such a proceeding be contrary both
to morality and to the principles of the law of nations? In short,
is the sanctity or the inviolability of treaties merely an abstract
theory or are there any rules to which the nations are morally
bound to look for guidance whenever the voidability or not of
their contracts arises?
In fine, is a state under the obligation to abide by the pro-
visions of a treaty it concluded either willingly or unwillingly,
or can there be any palliation or justification for the non-perform-
ance of an international agreement in certain contingencies?
Such are the questions which have taxed for centuries the
minds of many learned jurists and abstract moralists.
It is easier to ask than to answer such abstruse questions on
account of the conflict of views existing between legal moralists
25 Vattel, Le Droit Des Gens, ed. P. Fodr6, Lib. II, Ch. XII, Sec. 162,
p. iSI.2 See Vattel op. cit. II, Ch. XV, S. 230, p. 229. See also Geffeken, in
Holly, op. cit. III, p. 121. It seems that it was current belief in the mid-dle ages that treaties concluded with the Mohammedans were not bind-
ing upon the Christian nations. Some Roman Catholic authors contendbesides that the same rule was applicable to "heretics." See Bluntschli
op. cit. Art. 416, Note. See also Geffeken in Holly, op. cit. III, p. i16.
As a contrast to the above, one may mention the preamble of a treatydated 1747 between Nadir, Shah of Persia and the Sultan Mahmoud of
Turkey in which it was said, "Glory be to God, who, among other things,has rooted out all hatred and enmity from the bosoms of these nations andhas commanded them to keep their treaties inviolable." Quoted by Sir R.
Phillimore, Commentaries Upon International Law, Vol. IL p. 66, ed. 1871.
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and practical jurists; the former viewing with alarni the possible
fragility of international compacts, whilst the latter, guided more
by utility than by abstract morality, countenancing, in some ex-
ceptional cases, the violation of the given word.
In order to understand this famous controversy it should be re-
membered that, in regard to their duration, treaties are divided
into those which are "of perpetual character" and which are
known in international law by the name of transitory 27 or treaties
of disposition,2 8 such as compacts for the recognition of the in-
dependence or status of a state, the cession or exchange of ter-
ritory, the delineation of boundaries, those creating federal unions,
and in some cases engagements regulating more private rights;
and those called treaties proper, which, without being of a per-
manent character, imply that they shall be binding either during
the time fixed for their duration or as long as they are not abro-
gated or denounced by the contracting party or parties. Such are
the treaties of amity and friendship; those of commerce and
navigation and numerous other conventions of a varied char-
acter.
Whilst transitory treaties being considered as of a perma-
nent character, at least, as far as human things may be perma-
nent-subsist even independently of a declaration of war between
the contracting parties; the treaties proper, on the contrary, are
in such a case held as being ipso facto abrogated-though the
tendency of the advanced school of modern writers is in favor
of their retention, or, at least, their suspension during the
hostilities, and revival after the conclusion of peace without the
necessity of entering into new agreements.
-7 See Vattel op. cit. Lib. II, Ch. XII, S. 153, ed. P. Fodr6, p. 138.
Also G. F. de Martens. Pr&is de droit des gens modernes de rEurope.
Lib. I, Ch. II, S. 58. P Fodr6 op. cit. ii. Nos. 865, 9o6, 9ii.
28 See Rivier op. cit. ii, p .... Also Westlake, Vol. I, pp. 6o, 283.
They have been called transitory because it seems they have in view an
object specified definitely and are accomplished by a single and not by
repeated acts. See Vattel, Ib. ii, Ch. XII, S. 153, p. 138, et seq. Or, "be-
cause their effect passes over (transit) into and forms a part of the body
of rights concerning the thing in question, so that it is possible in subse-
quent dealings to start from that body of rights as a fact." Westlake,
International Law, Part I, p. 61. Westlake critcises with justice the term
transitory, because it suggests, as he says, "a fleeting character for docu-
ments of which the operation is really the most important." He therefore
approved the term of dispositive treaties. C. Westlake, 1b. p. 6r.
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Leaving, therefore, aside the transitory treaties, the inviolability
of which seems not to be generally questioned, 0 on account of
their character of permanency per se, so to speak, let us examine
the case of a treaty proper, concluded for an indefinite period,
in which there exists no clause by which the parties have reserved
to themselves the right to abrogate at any time such instrument
without mutual consent.
The question is whether treaties of that character can be abro-
gated without the mutual consent of the contracting parties.
There seem to be three leading opinions on this subject. Some
writers hold that treaties cannot tinder any circumstances be
abrogated without the consent of all the contracting parties;
others, after admitting the doctrine of the sanctity of international
compacts, seem to favor the view that a change of circumstances
not foreseen at the time of the conclusion, may justify a State
in not considering itself bound to abide by the provisions of such
compact; and finally there are some jurists who contend that
when a treaty hinders seriously the development and progress of
the people of a country it may be renounced even against the
will of the other contracting party or parties.
The number of jurists of the first class, namely, those who
still cling to the theory of Bynkershock, 0 that international com-
pacts should not under any circumstances be violated or re-
nounced without the consent of both contracting parties, is very
limited.
The question is certainly not new, and as Grotius informs us,
it had occupied also the minds of the jurists of his time. "It is
customary," he says, "to discuss as to whether promises contain in
themselves this implied condition: if things remain in their actual
state." He adds, "this is to be denied, unless it is quite clear
that the actual state of things was included in that sole reason to
which we referred."3'
Vattel, the great champion of the sanctity of treaties, after
declaring that the peace, the happiness and the safety of the
human race depend upon the "fulfilment of a given promise,"
29 See however, contrary views of P. Fodiri op. cit. ii, No. 91I. Also
Piidelievre. Pricis de Droit International Public, Vol. I, p. 316.
3oSee Bynkershock Lib. ii, Ch. X. See summary of views on this
point by Prof. Olivi in Revue de Droit International et de Legislation
compare. Vol. 23, p. 59o, et seq.
31 See Grotius Lib. 11, XVI, 25, 2. ed. P. Fodiri, p. 301.
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adds: "He who violates his treaties, violates . . . the law of
nations, for he disregards the faith of treaties, which the law of
nations declares sacred," and further, "infamy must ever be the
portion of him who violates his faith."
According to Vattel all nations are justified in uniting for the
purpose of repressing the State which "shows disregard for it (a
treaty), which openly sports with it, which violates and tramples it
under foot." 32 The distinguished Swiss author, after laying
stress on the inviolability of treaties, examines the theory of the
conventio omnis intelligitur rebus sic stantibus, namely that in
every compact there is an implied condition that if the state of
things, since the promise was made, changes, such compact may
be set aside, says, "If it is evident that the consideration of the
actual state of things was one of the reasons which occasioned the
promise . . . . (its fulfilment) depends upon preservation of
things in the same condition." To borrow one of the examples
given by Vattel, an elective prince, having no issue, promises to
his ally to have him appointed as his successor. Subsequently he
has a son born. "Who can doubt," he says, "that the promise has
been nullified by that event?" 3 He, however, advises moder-
ation in this application of this theory: "It would have been abus-
ing shamefully," he says, "to take advantage of every change
... . for disengaging one's self from every promise.
3 4
P. Fod6', one of the most distinguished writers on the law of
nations, after laying down the principle that _ state is bound to
respect its treaty stipulations no matter how injuriously they may
affect its interests, contends that such respect can only last as long
as the relations between the moral and the material forces of the
states which concluded such treaties continue to exist." In short,
that treaties are binding as long as the reasons by which the parties
were induced to conclude them, have not disappeared. "' Continu-
ing his argument, he says that the implied condition of every
treaty is that it shall be obligatory as long as the circumstances
which were the reason for their conclusion have not changed.
This author, however, admits that if in such a case a State de-
32 See Vattel, Le droit des Gens. Lib. ii, Ch. XV. pp. 218, 219, 220,
221, 222. See also Lib. ii, Ch. XII. S. 363.
3 3b. Vattel Lib. xi, Ch. XVII, p. 277, S. 296.
341 b. Vattel. S. 296. p. 278.
3= P. Fodr6. np. cit. 33. pp. 1152, 1153.
SANCTITY OF TREATIES
nounces a treaty, she must indemnify the other contracting party
for the damage caused by such act.86
Rivier, the eminent Swiss or Belgian author, after referring to
the foundation of the obligatory character of treaties which he
ascribes to the consent of nations growing out of mutual
interest and necessity, says, "old or dead provisions (in
a treaty) should not paralyze indefinitely the development of
states, which are living organisms, liable to perish if they do not
make any progress," and that "as there are no judges to whom
states may appeal to set aside their compacts, they can do so, at
times, proprio inotu, by virtue of the initial right of self-preserva-
tion." 3
Conversing further on the subject, he says that "as individuals
cannot bind themselves during all their lives, so nations cannot
deprive themselves of their liberty of action for all times." 38
Rivier therefore indorses the doctrine of the Rebus sic stantibus
with certain qualifications, namely, that in such cases the state
wishing to denounce the treaty should prove the change of cir-
cumstances, 0 and approach the other contracting party in order to
obtain its consent for the abrogation of the treaty by paying a suit-
able compensation."
L. Gessner, indorsing the principle of denunciation in case of
the substantial change of circumstances, admits that such theory
has an "extremely elastic character." 41
Pasquale Fiore, of the University of Naples, one of the lead-
ing Italian authors on International Law, in championing the
principle of the sanctity of treaties, says, that international rela-
tions would have been impossible, had it not been considered an
imperative duty for states to respect their compacts. After ascrib-
ing to morality and justice the foundation of the faithful execu-
tion of treaties,42 he admits that there may be cases when political
36 lb. II, 9o5. See also No. 9o8 and i2oo.
87 See A. Rivier. Principes du droit des gens. Vol. II, pp. 38, 40.
88 lb. II, p. 128.
39 Ib. II, p. 130.
40 Ib. II, p. 129.
41 Gessner in Holtzendorfs Handbuch der Volkerrecht, Vol. IIT, p.
8o. See also Wheaton, Elements of International Law,. ed. Laurence,p. 326. See also Wheaton, Digest of International Law, Vol. II, pp. 29r,
235.
42 See Pasquale Fiore Trattato di Diritto Internazionale publico, Vol.
II, SS. io4o and 1o41.
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wisdom and public necessity may force a State to violate the
sacred principle of the respect due to treaties; namely, when the
provisions of such a treaty injure seriously the interests of the
people. 3
He therefore disapproves the view of Bynkershoek that a State
should fulfill its promise even if that would lead to the ruin of the
people, and indorses the view of other writers, who hold that
a change of circumstances may be a good justification for the de-
nunciation of a treaty. Fiore is, however, of opinion that in all
such cases a state wishing to abrogate its treaty obligations,
should, before denouncing the treaty, make an effort to come to an
understanding with the other contracting party and in case of dis-
agreement, refer the solution of the question to an arbitral
tribunal. 4 4
Professor Olivi, of the University of Modena (Italy) is of
opinion that a change of circumstances may justify the denuncia-
tion of a treaty, if such a change was expressly or tacitly fore-
seen by the contracting parties at the time of the agreement, or
if an important change of that character renders the execution of
the instrument impossible or, if executed, would endanger the
life of a State, but he does not consider mere utility or injury
to the interests of a nation as being sufficient to affect the forces
of treaty obligations.
45
Rolin-Jacquemyns, a writer of great merit and distinction,
views with favor the theory of the clausula rebus sic stantibus,
provided it is not abused. He holds that a change of circum-
stances which makes the execution of a treaty either morally or
materially impossible, may justify an ex parte denunciation of it.
Otherwise, he says, one would conclude that treaties are perpetual,
which is, he adds, an absurdity.'0
Hall, one of the best recent authors of international law, ap-
proves the view that "a contract ceases to be binding as soon as
anything which formed an implied condition of its obligatory
force at the time of its conclusion is eventually altered," but he
adds that "if an implied condition was originally consistent with
the primary right of self-preservation it shall remain so." He,
43Fiore lb. S. 1o54.
'4 Fiore Ib. 1055, io56.
4, See Revue de Droit International et de Ligislation Comparie. Vol.
XXIII, p. 602.
40 Revue de droit International et de Legislation compare. Vol.
XIX, p. 46.
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however, holds that a treaty may become void if it endangers the
life or is incompatible with the independence of a State, "provided
that its injurious effects were not intended . . .. at the time
of its conclusion.47
Westlake, the eminent contemporary internationalist, treating
the subject of "the obsolescence of treaties," as he calls it, refers
to the theory of the "rebus sic stantibus," and without indorsing
or rejecting it, admits that "although the right of denouncing
a treaty is an imperfect one, still it cannot be condemned in
toto, and that it should be exercised with a grave sense of moral
responsibility." 4s
Merignac, a leading contemporary authority on international
law, after laying down the rule that in principle in "perpetual
treaties" the consent of all contracting parties should be obtained
for their abrogation, adds that treaties cannot be perpetual in the
proper sense, and that therefore in all such instruments "of per-
petual character" there is, he says, an implied condition of "rebus
sic stantibus," because the public authorities cannot "bind in-
definitely the future generations."40
According to the opinion of the eminent Russian author, F. de
Martens, the obligatory character of treaties is founded on the
"idea of international relations" and that as it is the interest
which induces states to conclude them, it is the interest again
that guarantees their execution." From these premises, the writer
draws the conclusion that "international treaties have an obliga-
tory character by reason of their conformity to the real needs of
states and the exigencies of international relations." He therefore
approves the policy of his country when in i87o the Czar de-
nounced certain provisions of the treaty of Paris of i856, simply
because they were, according to the Russian writer, in conflict
with the fundamental rights of an independent state, such as
Russia." Martens, however, champions the maxim "Pacta sunt
servanda," and says that treaties ought to be carried out faith-
fully. And, in order either to suspend, or postpone, indefinitely
their execution, he is of opinion that the consent of all the con-
4' See Hall, A Treatise on International Law, p. 357. ed. i9o4.48 See Westlake International Law, I, pp. 24, 285.
49Merignac, Traiti de droit public international, Vol. 1, p. 133. Also
lb. Vol. II, pp. 669, 670.
50See F. Martens' Trait& de Droit Intcrnational, Vol. 1, pp. 512,
513, 514. Also p. 56o.
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tracting parties should be obtained, which looks as being in con-
tradiction with his former view on the subject." He besides ap-
proves the theory of the rebus sic stantibus and contends that the
abuse of that doctrine does not prove that it should not be adopted,
and that a state cannot reasonably, conclude a treaty, except in
view of a political object and that if by reason of a change of cir-
cumstances, the object in view cannot be attained and the existence
of the treaty becomes dangerous to a state, the effect of such in-
strument ceases to exist.5 2
Paternostro, of the University of Rome, in an able essay on
the alleged right of Japan to put an end ex parte to the treaties by
which some foreign powers had formerly acquired certain special
privileges for their subjects, such as the right of having consular
courts in the Japanese Empire, contended that a state cannot
impose upon others a perpetual arrangement by which it would
derive all the advantages, and to the detriment of the interests of
the other state. Following that argument, the writer concludes
that a treaty obligation "comes to an end when it.compromises the
normal and necessary conditions of the development of the
state," when the provisions of such treaty have become incompati-
ble with the necessary development of its political constitution on
its municipal law; and lastly, when certain facts upon which the
parties relied at the time of the conclusion of the instrument, have
since undergone a modification. "s
Sir Travers Twiss, the English jurist, who has contributed so
much to the development of the law of nations by his writings.
criticises the radical view of Paternostro, but he admits that when
the provisions of a treaty in consequence of a change of circum-
stances, affect seriously the interests of a nation, it is the duty of
the other contracting party to consent to a modification of it, pro-
vided such a change does not injure its interests.5 4
According to Sir Robert Phillimore, the learned English author,
it is upon a scrupulous fidelity in the observation of treaties, not
merely in their letter, but in their spirit, "that obviously depends,
under God, the peace of the world." "Pacta sunt servanda," he
adds, "is the pervading maxim of International as it was of
5' F. de Martens, Ib. pp. 545, 546.
52 F. de Martens, I, Ib. p. 56o.
-3 See Revue de Droit International et de lIgislation comparke, Vol.
XXIII, p. i8g, et seq.
" See also Revue de Droit International et de L/gislation Cornparc,
Vol. XXV, p. 224.
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Roman law." He however, does not seem to disapprove the prin-
ciple of the "rebus sic stantibus.",
Von Liszt, the distinguished Professor of the University of
Berlin, does not approve, in principle, the theory of the "clausula
rebus sic stantibus." He contends that that doctrine may be ap-
plicable only to treaties whicl when concluded had in view
certain fixed conditions, which conditions have subsequently tin-
dergone a modification. He is therefore of opinion that in such a
case they may be denounced. For instance, he continues, if a
treaty guaranteed the territory of a state and that state, after the
conclusion of the treaty, increased her territory by acquiring ex-
tensive colonial possessions, the party that assumed such guaranty
may be justified in disengaging itself from such treaty obligation
on account of the increase of the duties imposed upon its govern-
ment.56
Nys, one of the most distinguished contemporary writers on
the law of nations, voices with apprehension the adoption, purely
and simply, of the doctrine of the clausuka rebus sic stantibus.5
Pinheiro-Ferreira, a well-known Portuguese jurist, comment-
ing on the "perpetuity of treaties," is surprised to find that the
principle of the perpetuity of international compacts meets with
the approval of Vattel, because according to this commentator,
any obligation of such -character is "anti-juridical," and therefore,
as he says, the future generations are justified in denouncing such
agreements, if they do not find them to be just and equitable,
provided they pay a suitable compensation to the other contracting
party in case the latter suffers any damages in consequence of such
act."'
The eminent Portuguese writer, in another chapter of Vattel,
dealing with this subject, argues that as the individuals can set
aside their contracts in case of an "enormous injury," so the
states may consider themselves as not bound to carry out their
treaty obligations, if the circumstances under whose influence they
concluded such instruments, have undergone a change. Ferreira,
however, urges that in such cases the State denouncing such
55 See Sir Robert Phillimore, Commentaries upon International Law,
Vol. II, pp. iog, Iso. ed. 187r.
50 See F. Von Liszt. Das 1'3lkerrecht. pp. 175. r76. ed. 19o4.
57 See Nys, Le Droit International. Vol. Ill. p. 49, e seq.
-8 See Vattel ed. P. Fodr6, p. 618, note i.
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treaty should, if necessary, pay suitable compensation to the other
contracting " party or parties.
Hautefeuille. in the preliminary discourse of his excellent work
on the rights of neutrals, referring to international compacts, ad-
mits their obligatory force, with certain qualifications. He lays
down the rule that treaties by which a State was compelled to
abandon only one of her essential and natural rights, such as that
of independence-even if it is a partial law-are not binding upon
the people of such State. He argues that natuial rights are in-
alienable, and to use the language, he adds, of the civilians,
they are extra con mmercium. In regard to perpetual treaties which
have.been concluded with the free will of both contracting parties,
for the regulation of private interests, they exist, he continued,
as long as the contracting parties desire the continuation of such
treaty. and the agreement of perpetuity has no other effect than
tlat of avoiding the necessity of renewing such treaties, in
order to insure the continuation of the same relations. He very
justly observes that unequal treaties, such as those imposing a
cession of territories, or payment of a war indemnity and the like
character, are always obligatory, and cannot be recalled after they
have been executed.
60
Bluntschli, the Swiss or German jurist, whose writings, besides
other merits, show so much originality of conception, after laying
down the rule, "that the respect of treaties is one of the necessary
foundations of the political and international organizations of the
world," adds that "if treaty promises were not kept" the law
itself would crumble down in the midst of the tempests of conflict-
ing opinions and interests ;" he seems, however, to contradict him-
self when he says that a State may consider as null and void,
treaties which are incompatible with its existence and develop-
ment. He argues that the right derived from treaties should
give way to the primordial and inalienable rights of existence
and the necessary development of states.
2
59 See Vattel op. cit. ed. Fod6r. I, p. 138, note i. Also see Vattel
op. cit. ed. Fod6r6 II, pp. 188, i8g,note.
60 See Hautefeuille. Des Deoits et des Devoirs dcs Nations Neutres.
Vol. 1, pp. ro, ii.
61 See Bluntschli. Le Droit International Codifi . ed. Lardy, Art. 410.
621Bluntschli. Ib. Art. 415. Paternostro of the University of Rome
seems to indorse the radical theory of Bluntschli. See R. D. I. op. cit.
XXIII, p. 189, et seq.
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Bluntschli further contends that the right of denunciation of a
treaty may result from circumstances and that the nature of the
public law requires the admission of the right to denounce a treaty
in certain cases, even if that right was not specifically reserved in
the provisions of the instrument. He justifies his theory by saying
that the welfare of a nation may be compromised by a treaty, and
that one generation cannot bind for all times future generations. 3
Referring to the theory of the clausula rebus sic stantibus,
Bluntschli admits that when the order of things which was the
basis of the treaty is so changed by the lapse of time, that the
execution of its provisions seems now to be contrary to the nature
of things, the obligation to respect the treaty ceases to exist. Ile,
however, disapproves the view of those writers who hold that the
clause "rebus sic stantibus" is implied in every treaty and that if
the circumstances change, the treaty ceases to be binding upon the
contracting parties.64
Bluntschli's conclusion is that "treaties which have in view the
destruction of a State are not binding, and cease to be obligatory
as soon as their destructive character is shown." "
Heffter, another German writer of equal celebrity, seems also
to have radical views on this subject: "A treaty cannot create
rights," he says, "but with the mutual consent that it cannot con-
tinue to exist but with such consent"; consequently, "in case one
of the parties changes its will, the other is entitled to ask the re-
establishment of things in their former condition and also to dam-
ages for the losses sustained." 66 He indorses the theory of the
right of.denunciation of a treaty on account of change of cir-
cumstances, not foreseen at the time of the agreement. But he
holds, that if such change affects only part of the treaty, such in-
strument can only be modified, but not abrogated.?
63 Ib. Art. 454.
64 Ib. Art. 456.
63 1b. Art. 46o.
66 See Heffter. Le Droit International de I'Europe, traduit par Berg-
son, ed. Geffeken. p. i8g.67 Heffter Ib. pp. 221, 222. Geffeken, his able commentator, however,
dissents from that view and holds that a treaty binds the will of the con-
tracting parties, and creates rights; that therefore it cannot be abrogated
without assigning a special reason justifying such cancellation. Heffter
Ib. p. i8g, note 3, by Geffeken. Geffeken commenting on the theory of
the rebus sic stantibus, says, that in order to justify a denunciation, it is
.necessary that one of the reasons, which at the time of the conclusion of
the treaty, formed an implied condition of its obligatory peace, should have
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From the above extracts of various authorities on the law of
nations, it is evident that the consensus of opinion is, with few
exceptions, in favor of the right of an ex parte renunciation of a
treaty, their disagreement being only in the nature of such cases.
With all the respect due to these distinguished expounders of
the law of nations, it may still be proper to make a distinction be-
tween compacts which may have been imposed upon a nation by
a treaty of peace or other means of compulsory character; con-
ventions by which a State-without divesting itself of its right
of sovereignty-leased to another part of its territory or grants
the right of occupation and administration of part of its do-
minions; and those concluded without any compulsion whatsoever.
but entered into with the free will of the contracting parties for
the furtherance of their mutual interests, be they of a political,
economical, social or other nature.
The violation of a treaty of peace or other instrument of com-
pulsory nature would deprive the hitherto victorious state of the
benefit of its victories, and it may be a dangerous doctrine to
adopt; that a vanquished State is justified on the first opportunity
in nullifying the stipulations of a treaty of peace or other instru-
ment to which such party is compelled to agree, or the plea that the
conditions imposed upon it by such a treaty are detrimental to its
interests. On the other hand, to incorporate within onc's do-
minions, without the consent of the Sovereign Power, a territory
over which a State has only, in some way, the usufruct, namely,
the right of occupation and administration, is purely an inter-
national spoliation.
But to revert to the first point, is a State, which by a treaty of
peace or other compulsory means, has been deprived of part of its
independence or accepted restrictions to its internal or external
sovereignty, bound to respect for all time the provisions of such
instrument? Some writers answer the question in the negative
s8
and the practice of nations shows that compacts of that character
cannot bind aggrieved states or people perpetually, and there may
be times when such nations may consider themselves as being
disengaged from their obligations.
undergone a material modificati6n. He criticises the action of Russia in
1870, when she denounced some provisions of the Treaty of Paris of 1856
in regard to the Black Sea and the Russian coast. Ib. p. 222, note 5.
as See Hautefeuille op. cit. I, p. io. See F. de Martens op. cit. I, p.
512, et seq. Also p. 56o. Westlake says that such treaties are "doomed
by their nature to obsolescence." See Westlake, op. cit. I, p. 285
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Russia, in comparatively recent times, has on two different oc-
casions challenged the doctrine of the sanctity of treaties by de-
claring as null and void certain treaty provisions which had been
imposed upon her by the other contracting parties in a public in-
strument. As is well known, it was in x87o, when the Czar's
Government repudiated some of the clauses of the treaty of Paris
of 1856, which had imposed certain limitations on the Sovereign
rights of Russia in the Black Sea and on the coast.
The diplomatic duel which followed that event between Lord
Granville championing the inviolability of treaties and Prince
Gortschaxoff viewing the matter in a different light, resulted in
an academic victory for Great Britain, but is a real triumph for
Russia.
In fact, in the Conference of London of i87i, the plenipotenti-
aries of the Power who took part in that Conference, after
recognizing that "it is an essential principle of the law of nations
that no Power can liberate itself from the engagements of a
treaty, nor modify the stipulations thereof, unless with the con-
sent of the contracting Po~iters by means of an amicable arrange-
ment," acceded to the Russian demand by abrogating the pro-
visions of the treaty which had been denounced by her.
John Stuart Mill, the well known English author, commenting
on the action of Russia denouncing some of the provisions of
the treaty (of Paris of 1856), said that "there are treaties which
never will, and even which never ought to be permanently ob-
served by those who have been obliged to submit to them; far
less, therefore tb be permanently enforced." He therefore advised
nations "to conclude trlaties only for a limited period of time."
Nations, he added, cannot rightfully bind themselves or others
beyond the period for which human foresight can be presumed to
extend, thus aggravating the danger which to some extent al-
ways exists that the fulfilment'of the obligations may, by change
of circumstances, become either wrong or unwise.6 9
Lorimer, the Scotch philosopher jurist, referring to the conduct
of Russia in this matter, said, "There can, I imagine, be no doubt
that she was entitled to invite her co-signatories to meet with her
for the consideration of such changes as she might suggest in the
treaty of 1856, or even its repeal; and that in the conference when
met, or apart from the conferefice if it refused to meet, she
might have renounced the treaty either in whole or in part."
69 See J. S. Mill, Fortnightly Review, Dec. r, 187o, p. 715, et seq.
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And further, "all consent is necessarily conditional, and a change
of circumstances swept away the conditions on which it rested."'7
But the enunciation of the principle of the Conference of Lon-
don did not deter again the Czar in 1881. From an Ukase by
which he abrogated the clause of the treaty of Berlin of 1878 by
which Russia agreed to make Batoum in the Black Sea a free
port.
The contention of the Russian Government then was that Arti-
cle 59 of the Treaty of Berlin was only declaratory and not,
therefore, binding upon Russia, because it was declared in that
article that the Emperor of Russia was intending to make Batoum
a free port and that consequently there was no legal obligation.71
The conclusion which may be drawn from the above diplomatic
incidents and the general principles of natural law, is that states
which may have been compelled to enter into compacts abandon-
ing even partially some of their Sovereign rights, may subse-
quently disengage themselves from such engagements, either with
or without the consent of the contracting parties; and therefore
the rule laid down in the protocol of the London Con-
ference of 1871 in regard to this subject, cannot, strictly speak-
ing, be applicable, in practice, to all public treaties.
Quite recently the world has witnessed instances of flagrant
violation of international treaties, one of the delinquents being a
co-signatory of the protocol of the London Cdnference of 1871,
which proceeding has shaken again the public confidence in the
value of compacts between nations.
In fact, on October 5, 19o8, Bulgaria, then a semi-sovereign
state, under the suzerainty of the Ottoman Sultan-and a "crea-
ture of the treaty of Berlin" (of 1878), to use the words of Mr.
Asquith, the British Prime Minister-not only declared its in-
dependence, which might have been excused from the point of
view of natural law, but also incorporated with its territory,
Eastern Roumelia-which, although it was administered by the
Prince of Bulgaria, continued -to belong to Turkey by virtue of
treaties-not to say anything of the appropriation at the same
time of the Oriental railway, the property of a foreign corporation
with a revertionary right to the Sublime Porte. All this was
70 See J. Lorimer, The Institutes of the Law of Nations, Vol. 1, pp.
47, 48.
71 See excellent article on this subject by Rolin-Jacquemyns in Revue
de Droit Internafional et de Legislation Covtpar~e, Vol. XIX, p. 37, et seq.
See also Russian view in F. de Martens, op. cit. Vol. I, p. 484, et seq.
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done without any offer of compensation to Turkey nor any ten-
dency to seek the consent of the Sovereign Power by conciliatory
means.
Prince Ferdinand's (now Czar of the Bulgarians) coup d'Etat
would not have attracted so much attention but for the act, at the
same time, of Emperor Francis Joseph, who, by a stroke of his
pen, made Bosnia and Herzegovina-the occupation and adminis-
tration of which provinces he had acquired by virtue of the treaty
of Berlin of i878-dependencies of the Dual Monarchy.
In fact, by a mere imperial proclamation 7 2 these provinces over
which the Sultan of Turkey had not divested himself of his sov-
ereignty, as it appears by the treaties-became part of the do-
minions of the Hapsbourgs.
The Emperor was tempted, it seems, to take this unusual step
"in order to raise Bosnia and Herzegovina to a higher level of
political life by establishing for them constitutional institutions"
and, in view of that benevolent intention, His Majesty deemed
the creation "of a clear and unambiguous juridical position for
the two lands" indispensable.78
This high-handed policy of Prince Ferdinand (now- the Czar of
the Bulgarians) and Emperor Joseph or rather of Baron Aeren-
thal, his foreign secretary, was bitterly assailed, with justice, in
many countries, and particularly in Great Britain. "It is impossi-
ble," said the British Premier, speaking in the House of Com-
mons, "for this country, in the interest of the value of treaties,
to recognize an alternation of them by an individual State with-
out the consent of the other parties. We hold," he added, "to
that principle." Ts
Nor was Sir Edward Gray, the Secretary of State, less emphatic
in his denunciation of these acts. After indorsing the principle
that no State has the right to alter the provisions of a treaty with-
out the consent of the other contracting party, he said: "If it is
to become the practice in foreign politics that any single Power
or State can at will make abrupt violations of international
treaties, you will undermine public confidence with all of us."7 '
72 See Times (London), October 6 and 7, i9o8.
73 See lb. Times, October 7 and 8, igo8.
73 See London Times, October 12, i9o8; also October 8, x9o3. See
also Guild Hall speech, Ib. Times, November io, i9o8.
74 See Ib. London Times, October 8, i9o8. See also statement of Lord
Fitzmaurice (Under Secretary of Foreign Affairs), in House of Lords,
and approval of policy by the Marquis of Lansdowne, Ex. Sec. of State.
Ib. Times, October 12, igo8.
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There is no doubt that in both these cases solemn treaty obliga-
tions were wantonly violated, and whilst, as above stated, the
act of a declaration of independence by the people of Bul-
garia may be justified for moral and sentimental reasons, the
severance of Eastern Roumania from Turkish sovereignty with-
out the offer of any compensation, and the seizure of the railways,
in violation of the treaty rights of Turkey should be condemned.
In regard to Austria-Hungary, there seems to be hardly any
ground of justification, and neither the sophistical explanations of
Baron Aerenthal,7 5 nor the legal arguments of a distinguished
Austrian jurist -6 can palliate the effect produced on the civilized
vorld, by the deliberate violation of solemn international com-
pacts.
The subsequent arrangement, however, made by the two delin-
quent states, namely, Austria-Hungary and Bulgaria, with the ag-
grieved party, namely, Turkey, by which the former Powers
agreed to pay pecuniary compensation to the Porte for the loss
of her sovereign rights, atoned to a certain extent the unwar-
rantable acts of those states, and proved again to the civilized
world that respect for the principles of the law of natiols may
be imposed upon "the members of the Society of Nations" by the
mere pressure of public opinion.
As a matter of fact, Turkey was entirely powerless to assert her
rights over these Powers, who committed the spoliation at her
expense.
The rigidity, however, of the principle of the inviolability of
treaties, cannot, with justice, apply to those instruments above re-
ferred to, which have ben agreed to by the contracting parties for
75 See statement of Baron Aerenthal to the Delegations. lb. Times,
October 8, i9o7. On October 1o, 191o, namely, nearly two years after the
coup d'etat, Baron Aerenthal, addressing again the same delegations and
referring to the annexation incident, tried to ease his conscience by making
the following startling statement: "It was impossible," he said, "to
speak of our having violated international law, since we have done nothing
that was forbidden by an international treaty." But as Dr. Kramarzh in
his answer to the Baron well observed, "When one has broken a treaty
one must have the courage of one's own lawlessness and not seek thread-
bare juridical arguments to prove the contrary." See Times, October
20, 1910.
76 See letter of Dr. Lammasch, Professor of International Law at the
University of Vienna. lb. Times, November io, i9o8. See also spirited
reply of Prof. Holland upholding the British view. lb. November 13,
1908
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an indefinite period, with their own free will, in order to promote
their mutual interests. If, therefore, after the lapse of a certain
time, it is found that on account of the change of circumstances,
not foreseen at the time of their conclusion, or independently of any
such change, it is evident that the execution oftheprovisions of such
treaties would materially affect the interests of a state or endanger
its safety or security, in such extreme cases of paramount im-
portance, it may fairly be admitted that a State is justified in
lenouncing such treaties or in proposing modifications com-
patible with the interests of the nation. But when a State is com-
pelled by necessity to resort to such an extreme measure, it is just
and right that it should pay to the other party or parties a rea-
sonable compensation, in case any damages would result from such
an ex parte abrogation of a treaty, especially if the aggrieved
State, in view of the execution of such instrument, has already
made arrangements, which seem to be now irrevocable.
Having reviewed the principle governing the inviolability of
international compacts, let us now take a concrete example of a
treaty proper, concluded for an indefinite period, in order to see
whether an ex parte denunciation of it would have been justifiable,
had one of the contracting parties to it resorted to that proceeding.
One of the best examples offered for our discussion, and nearer
to us than any other, is the so-called Clayton-Bulwer treaty of
185o, concluded between the United States and Great Britain for
the joint construction of a canal across Central America, joining
the Atlantic with the Pacific Ocean. As is well known, the con-
tracting parties agreed by that instrument, amongst other things,
that neither of them should obtain or maintain for itself any ex-
clusive control over the projected canal, and also that neither
should "erect or maintain any fortifications commanding the
canal, etc., etc., nor to colonize, assume or exercise any dominion
over any part of Central America."
That compact was certainly not a transitory treaty, namely, one
of "perpetual nature," but a treaty proper, not imposed upon
either contracting party by a treaty of peace or otherwise, but con-
cluded with the free will and entire liberty of action by both
Powers, for the furtherance of their political and other interests.
On the other hand, neither was its duration fixed, nor was there
any provision by which either party reserved to itself the right of
denunciation, as is provided in many treaties.
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Now, supposing Great Britain had refused to conclude the last
Hay-Pauncefote treaty, by which the United States Government
practically takes the entire control of the Panama Canal, now
under construction, the question would have been then as to
whether the United States would have been justified in denounc-
ing the Clayton-Bulwer treaty and making a separate arrange-
ment with the Republic of Panama or other Central American
country, for the construction of a canal contrary both to the let-
ter and spirit of the Clayton-Bulwer treaty.
The question may be answered in the affirmative, if the circum-
stances-not foreseen at the time of the conclusion of that treaty
-have so changed, as to make it now imperative upon the United
States to disengage itself from its obligations imposed by the
Clayton-Bulwer treaty, on account of such modification, or even
according to the view of certain writers, simply because the exist-
ence of such a treaty affected materially its interests and was a
serious hindrance to its national development.
It seems that the reasons which had actuated at that time the
conclusion of the Clayton-Bulwer treaty (which was even indi-
rectly a partial relinquishment of the Monroe doctrine, at least in
the sense that that doctrine is now understood to mean) were,
first: the lack of capital in the United States, and, second, the in-
tention of dispossessing Great Britain altogether from Central
America, where she claimed to have certain rights of protecto-
rate.-7
Leaving aside the contested point as to whether Great Britain
had or had not, by that treaty, relinquished her claims in Central
America, and examining the question as to whether there has
been, since the conclusion of that instrument, any material change
of circumstances, we find, first, a change in the financial situation
of the United States, which was at the time one of the reasons
that deterred this country from venturing alone in that huge enter-
prise,7 and second, which is much more important, the acquisition
7 As a matter of fact, Great Britain, even after the conclusion of
that treaty, claimed that she had not relinquished any actual, but only
future rights in Central America, and that the United States Secretary of
State had accepted that interpretation at the time of the exchange of the
ratification of that treaty. This, however, did not bind the United States,
because that arrangement or interpretation was not submitted to the
Senate.
-8 See Wheaton's Digest, op. cit. II, pp. 210, 212, 223.
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of the insular possessions in the Pacific, which, coupled with the
growth of a great Power, namely, of Japan, in the Far East,
makes it imperative upon the United States to devise new means
for the protection of the insular possession and even of the Pacific
coast. It is evident that this can only be done by the junction of
the Atlantic with the Pacific Ocean, in order to move speedily the
fleet from one ocean to another.
As a further safeguard, it will be, no doubt, necessary for the
United States to have the exclusive control and fortification of the
projected canal, excluding any joint protection, and other limita-
tions as it was provided in the Clayton-Bulwer treaty. Hence, the
absolute necessity of the abrogation of the Clayton-Bulwer treaty.
It is therefore clear that the U. S. Government, in view of
the above reasons, would have been justified in denouncing that
instrument even without the consent of Great Britain.
Still, this doctrine of the right of denunciation of an inter-
national agreement against the will of the other, contracting party
or parties, ought not to be so abused as to render any treaty null
and void for any trifling reason, or according to the whim of the
governing body of a nation, so as to shake the confidence of the
people for all international arrangements.
As President Arthur well observed in his message to Congress
on April i8, I88I, . . . . "a nation is justified in repudiating its
treaty obligations only when they are in conflict with great para-
mount interests" and that "even then all possible reasonable means
for modifying or changing those obligations by mutual agreement
should be exhausted before resorting to the supreme right of re-
fusal to comply with them."
Still, it is an error to assume that an instrument of the char-
acter of the Clayton-Bulwer treaty or other treaty of a like nature
is unassailable for all generations and all centuries to come, espe-
cially if it does not attain the object for which it was concluded
after the expiration of a reasonable time.
To admit such a theory, may be not to understand, but to mis-
understand the true meaning of the inviolability and sanctity
of treaties.
Boston, Mass. Theodore P. Ion.
